The Grenadiers led the way in the right column, the Scots Guards were on their left rear, the two battalions of Coldstreams were in reserve. Unfortunately these positions were not maintained. The Scots Guards came up abreast of the Grenadiers, but some distance to their left; the Grenadiers, instead of maintaining their direction, bore to the left and marched against Kaffir Kop; the Coldstreams diverged still further to the left; thus, instead of being concentrated for the attack on the central kopje, the brigade were scattered over a front of two miles. No doubt the efforts of the various battalions to find out each others' position delayed the advance, and they did not arrive until day had broken. The sun was just rising over the eastern hills when the Grenadiers came within three hundred yards of the foot of Kaffir Kop. Suddenly some guns placed on an eminence to its right opened fire, and at once a roar of musketry came from the top of the hill, while a heavy flanking fire also opened from Gun Hill, and a storm of bullets swept the line, many men falling at once, while the dust rose thickly around them as the Mauser bullets pattered fast on the sand. The order had been given that the troops were not to fire, but were to carry the hill at the point of the bayonet.
The pause was a short one. Joined by some of the Northamptons, who apparently had also missed their way, the Grenadiers fought their way up the hill. The Boers here, as at Talana, on the other side, lost heart as soon as they found to their astonishment that, in spite of their tremendous fire, the troops whom they had despised still pressed up the hill. They did not await their arrival at the crest, but fled precipitately down into the valley behind it, and took up a fresh position on another hill there. While the Grenadiers[Pg 113] had been engaged in this short but desperate conflict, the Scots Guards on their left had effected the capture of the central kopje. They rushed to the attack as bravely as their brothers-in-arms. The Boers on the summit had opened as hot a fire upon their assailants as had the defenders of Kaffir Kop, but the troops were not exposed to such a terrible cross-fire, and the consequence was, their loss was comparatively small.
On the left the fighting had been sharp. The enemy had thrown out outposts towards the railway from Table Hill, and the Northamptons were soon engaged in driving them in. At the foot of the hill, however, the Boers made a stand. They had thrown up some stone breast-works, and held them until the Northamptons pushed forward to the right and so took the defenders of the sangars in flank, and forced them to quit their position and retire to the hill. The two regiments then advanced to storm the position. The defence of the Boers here was more feeble and half-hearted than that offered at Gun Hill and Kaffir Kop. On gaining the summit the infantry halted until the guns came up and opened fire on the next range of hills, where the Boers, driven from their first line of defences, had now ensconced themselves, keeping up a continuous fire from among the rocks. Two regiments advanced and seized a ridge to the south, from which the Boers had been maintaining a flanking fire; but they could advance no farther, for the Yorkshires and Munsters, who should have been their supports, had been withdrawn.
This was an unfortunate tactical error. Had they been with their brigade, and had this been strengthened by one of the Coldstream battalions, our left could have pressed steadily on and have driven the Boers by the south-east route, where they would have been harassed as they passed by the fire of the Guards Brigade, and cut up by the little body of cavalry that had arrived there from Witputs. The Coldstreams came late into action, but they attacked and carried the hill called Mont Blanc, while they aided the Scots Guards to capture another eminence to the south of that hill. They[Pg 114] were aided by the artillery and by the guns of the Naval Brigade, which now, after tremendous efforts by the marines and sailors, had been brought up.
The enemy, disheartened at the manner in which they had been driven from position after position, now gave way altogether. Their only means of retreat was to cross the level ground to the north-east, and had there been a strong force of cavalry, with a battery or two of horse-artillery, under Lord Methuen's orders, their defeat would have been converted into a disastrous rout. But half of the little force were on the other flank, there was no horse-artillery, and although the little party of Lancers and Rimington's Guides attempted to perform the work assigned to them, they were unable to do so. The broken ground running north from Table Hill was held by a strong body of Boers, who covered the retreat of their waggons and guns. In no case could they have overtaken the flying horsemen, for their chargers were worn out by the heavy work of scouting they had carried on. Water, too, had been short since they had left the Orange River, and after suffering a good many casualties they fell back. The battle was virtually over by six o'clock, having lasted about two hours.
Yorke had ridden with Rimington's Guides from Belmont, and, as they were on the extreme left of the fighting-line, had seen little indeed of the combat. That the British were gaining ground was evident from the direction from which the roar of battle reached them, and when at length the order came for them to advance, they had ridden forward eagerly until checked by the heavy fire opened from the low line of rocky eminences facing them. To have pressed on against riflemen hidden among rocks would have been to incur certain and heavy loss, and might have deprived the army of its already utterly insufficient cavalry force; consequently Colonel Gough, who was in command, reluctantly gave the order for them to retire. Yorke had the evening before handed over his Kaffirs to the medical department as stretcher-bear[Pg 115]ers, and as soon as firing ceased and it was evident that the battle was over, he rode across the country to give what aid he could in the work.
He found that the greater part of the British wounded had already been carried off by the troops, some in the ambulance waggons, some on stretchers. By half-past ten the infantry were already in camp, and by one all the wounded were being attended to in the hospitals. The loss of the Grenadiers, 117 men killed or wounded and 10 officers, exceeded that suffered by the whole of the rest of the division. The Northumberlands and Northamptons had over 60 casualties among the men and 6 among their officers; of these the Northumberlands had by far the larger share. Yorke, after seeing the last of the wounded, Briton and Boer, placed on ambulances, was now free, and fastening his horse to a sagebush, he and Hans ascended the hill the Grenadiers had won.
On reaching the summit he saw that it had been carefully prepared for defence, and had evidently been occupied for a long time. The wall was not, as it had appeared, continuous, but was broken up into little enclosures or forts, each sufficiently large for two or three men to live and sleep in; straw, old sacking, and brushwood formed the beds. In each were generally to be seen the ashes of a fire, a cooking pot, meat tins, fragments of bread, and other signs of continued occupation.
Empty cartridge-cases littered the ground everywhere, while many still loaded showed how hasty had been the flight of the Boers. Several dead bodies lay in these little forts; they were for the most part of men of the lower class, farm-servants and others, with rough ill-fitting clothes and closely-cropped heads. Among them, however, were a few of a very much superior class, clean and carefully dressed, but these were quite the exception; and Yorke afterwards heard from the prisoners that men of that class generally sent on their best horses, and rode in on spare animals or in light carriages and carts, and as soon as they saw that the fight was going against[Pg 116] them, ran down the hill, jumped on to their fresh horses, and rode off, leaving the unmounted men to fight and die. Eighty-three Boers were found dead, but it was certain that the bodies of many of the better-class Boers had been carried off when they fell. More than fifty prisoners were taken, and twenty wounded; sixty-four waggons and a considerable number of horses were captured.
The next day all the wounded were sent down by train. That afternoon the troops moved forward again, knowing that another Boer force was collected at Graspan, some seven miles to the North. The Ninth Brigade and the Naval Brigade started in the afternoon for Swingspan, while the Guards moved on somewhat later with the Naval guns, armoured train, and baggage. Lord Methuen's intention was this time to attack the left of the Boer position, which was planted along a low range of hills, the highest and most commanding of which lay on their left.
The Ninth Brigade, with Rimington's horse and the Lancers, bivouacked at Swingspan, a deep depression in a valley surrounded on all sides by hills of volcanic origin. The march had been an uneventful one. The cavalry had scouted the ground in front of them, but beyond beating up a herd of springbok, and startling an occasional covey of partridges, scaring up the little birds called dikkopfs, and sending the lizards hurrying to their shelters, they saw no signs of life. The effect of the previous day's fight was evident from the fact, that although the line of march was everywhere commanded by low hills, no shot was fired. It was difficult for the troops gathered round the pool to believe that the smooth circle of hills around them was ages ago a number of active volcanoes, and that the pool might itself have been a crater; but the fact has been well ascertained. Fires were lighted, but these soon burnt down, for the men were glad to stretch themselves on the sands and fall to sleep as soon as the kettles were boiled and their bread had been eaten. Pickets went up to the surrounding hills, and one of these found in a sangar[Pg 117] a field-glass and walking-stick, showing that the Boers had occupied it but a short time before.
At three in the morning the troops were in motion again, and marched for five miles towards a line of kopjes some three miles from the railway-station. The station bore the two names of Enslin and Graspan, by both of which the battle was afterwards called. The Lancers scouted ahead, while Rimington's Guides watched the hills on the right. At last the enemy's entrenchments were seen extending along a series of kopjes. Their right was on two hills, one lying on each side of the railway, the left upon a high conical hill three miles to the east of it. On the ridges between were several guns, and through field-glasses the Boers could be seen hurrying towards the eastern kopje, against which they already perceived our main attack would be delivered. One of the field-batteries at once advanced and opened fire against this hill.
The armour-plated train had moved to Graspan station, and the sailors got out two of their twelve-pounder guns, leaving the others in the waggons, as there were not hands enough to work them. Presently these were joined by two batteries of artillery, and at half-past six all opened fire. Two companies of the Northumberlands acted as a covering party, and the rest were to line a low crest to the right and keep touch with the other battalions of the brigade posted there to oppose any movement that might be made from the Boer centre. Of such a movement, however, there was but little probability, as the Boers from that point were galloping with all haste to reinforce the defenders of the hill which was about to be assailed.
For two hours the fight was purely an artillery duel, the Naval guns and those of the two batteries being answered by six guns, a Hotchkiss, and a Maxim. These were well hidden from sight behind the crest line, and it was only by the light smoke that rose above them that our gunners were enabled to direct their fire. The Guards were in rear, and were held in[Pg 118] reserve to take part in the fight wherever their services might be most required. The Naval Brigade were upon the extreme right, and it was upon them that the honour of the assault was to fall. Entrenchments had been thrown up by the enemy along the whole range of kopjes. It was evident that the Boers were in no way discouraged by their defeat two days before, for a very large body of mounted men were seen far out on our flank, in readiness to swoop down if we recoiled in confusion after failing to carry their position. Rimington's Guides were detached to watch and keep in check this force. At eight o'clock the two batteries of Royal Artillery moved away to the right to concentrate their fire on the kopje about to be attacked, and the Naval guns were ordered to withdraw, as the Boers had now accurately obtained their distance and were keeping up a tremendous fire with shrapnel upon them.
The enemy's fire, however, was so incessant and well-directed, that the officer in command, feeling that to attempt to withdraw the guns would lead to the annihilation of the men engaged in the work, maintained his position, the men throwing themselves on the ground at each flash of the enemy's guns and then leaping up and working their own pieces. So well were these served and directed that the guns opposed to them were gradually silenced.
The Naval Brigade, composed of two hundred marines and forty blue-jackets, at last advanced in skirmishing order, and pushed round to the right of the kopje. Although they were within nine hundred yards of it not a rifle was fired, and it seemed as if the fire of the two batteries had completely cleared out its defenders. The Lancers had moved still farther to the right, to prevent any body of Boers coming down through a break in the hills there to take the Naval Brigade in flank.
The ground over which they were moving was completely exposed. Having gained the desired position, the Naval Brigade now moved direct for the kopje, closing up somewhat[Pg 119] as they converged upon its base. When within six hundred yards from the summit, from every rock and boulder a storm of fire flashed out, and a hail of bullets swept the line. The men lay down and returned the fire, but that of the hidden foe, enormously superior in numbers, was not to be checked. The North Lancashires who were following the Naval men completely lost sight of them, so great was the cloud of dust raised by the bullets ploughing up the sand. It was evident that to remain inactive was to court annihilation, and Captain Prothero, R.N., gave the word for the advance at the double, and the men leaping to their feet rushed to within four hundred yards of the base. Then a terrific fire was opened from a projecting spur.
The men fell fast, but again made a rush to within two hundred yards of the base of the hill. Prothero had fallen wounded; Ethelston, the second in command, was killed, Major Plumbe of the marines called upon his men, who nobly responded; he himself was shot dead before he had gone ten yards, and Lieutenant Saunders of the Powerful now rushed to the front. The Maxim gun that had accompanied them remained immovable, every one of the men who worked it having fallen. They reached the base of the kopje and there threw themselves down to breathe. They had left half their comrades and nearly all their officers behind them. The din was appalling, the two British batteries maintaining a continuous fire on the face and summit of the hill. The Yorkshire Light Infantry, followed by the North Lancashires, came rushing forward to the support of the naval men, and in open order with bayonets fixed they and the marines began to make their way up.
The Boers did not await the onslaught, but deserted their entrenchments and rocks and fled, the greater portion making their way along a valley through which ran a road to the north, only a few joining their friends along the line of hills. In the centre of the position a handful of desperate men defended the rocks to the last, and were bayoneted there.[Pg 120] Seeing that the position they had deemed impregnable had been captured the Boers began to retreat, drawing off their guns with them. Again the weakness in cavalry prevented pursuit; and indeed both the Lancers and Rimington's Guides were too far away to be brought up in time for a successful pursuit of the mounted men, who formed the majority of the enemy's force. As to those unprovided with ponies, they had but to scatter over the hills where cavalry could not follow them, lie hidden among the boulders, and make off after nightfall.
The loss had been heavy. Of the Naval Brigade six officers and ninety-nine men were killed or wounded; the Yorkshires had fifty-three casualties, and the North Lancashires twenty. The Guards' Brigade were not engaged; they closed up at the end of the action, but were not called upon to fire a shot.
All but two of Yorke's Kaffirs who had been away came into camp after the battle was over. They had left the waggons while the fight was going on, and had hidden among the rocks until night fell. None had gained any information as to the Boer position on the Modder. None of the Boers whom they had heard conversing had been there. They had been told that the British would never get across the river, and even if they did so they would assuredly never be able to break through the strong position at Magersfontein, where Cronje intended to arrest their further advance. They had heard that no natives had been allowed to accompany the Boers who were posted on the Modder River, and that all new-comers had been directed to Graspan, a step which Yorke concluded was designed to prevent spies or well-wishers to the British from seeing the preparations that were made. He reported as usual to the quartermaster-general.
"It is a pity that we can't get some news as to what they are doing, Mr. Harberton, but certainly you have done all that is possible that way."
"I will try and go in disguise, sir, if you will give me leave."
[Pg 121]
"I do not think there is any chance whatever that your attempt would be successful. It is evident that Cronje is determined that his plans shall be kept secret. I have no doubt that you could, as you have already done, join any commando you wished, with a fair chance of a plausible story being believed. But the fact that all the new arrivals were sent on here, and that even Kaffir drivers are not allowed to approach the river, shows that no ordinary story would pass muster for a moment. You would simply be going to your death."
"It has been tougher work than we expected, Harberton," one of the officers of the Tigers said to Yorke the next day. "Of course we thrashed them, but the loss has been heavy, and as these kopjes are scattered all over the country, we may have to fight any number of battles like this. You see, the beggars only have to ride off on their ponies and take up a fresh position; necessarily we are kept at a distance out of fire; and before we can take up the pursuit and cross the hills they have been defending, they have got a couple of miles start of us. Besides, their horses are ever so much fresher than ours, so they could go on at that game for a very long time, and there can be no doubt their losses are much lighter than ours as we are always fighting in the open, while they are so hidden behind rocks that we don't get sight of them until they begin to bolt. However, we shall be stronger to-morrow, for I hear that the Argyle and Sutherlands will be up. That will a good deal more than fill up the vacancies caused by our casualties at Belmont and here."
The next day was passed in quiet, but on the 27th, after the wounded had been sent off by train, the force moved forward to the pools of Honeynest, eight miles south of the Modder. The march had been short, for the heat was great, and after halting the troops revelled in the luxury of a bath, the fact that the water was thick and muddy scarcely detracting from their enjoyment. The next morning one of Rimington's Guides came in and reported that he had been[Pg 122] fired at from an apparently empty house near the river, and half an hour later another of Yorke's Kaffirs came in and told Yorke that the Boers with whom he had been, had made a long detour after the battle and had arrived at the Spytfontein kopjes. He found that there were very strong works there, but that they were not strongly occupied; and he had learned that a part of the force had some days before moved towards the Modder, but that no communication was allowed between them and Spytfontein.
Yorke at once went and reported the news. "That is important," the officer said. "I shall be glad if you will come with me at once to Lord Methuen, and you may as well bring your native with you, the general may wish to question him further."
The general indeed considered the information of such importance that he sent at once for one of Rimington's Guides, who spoke Kaffir perfectly, and through him asked the native many questions. There can be no doubt that the news that the main body of the Boers had at any rate moved forward towards the Modder influenced him in deciding upon the course he adopted. It had before been open to him to leave a battalion to hold the railway bridge, to prevent any Boers who might be there from crossing, and so cover the line of communication, while with the rest of his force he made a detour through Jacobsdal, and, making a wide sweep, as French's cavalry did later on, come down upon Kimberley from the north; but the fact that a large main Boer army was massed, if not at the Modder, at some place near, altered the situation. The river was fordable at many points, and were he to move away Cronje might throw his whole force across, crush the detached battalion, and take possession of the railway. It was, therefore, imperative that the direct advance upon Kimberley should be adopted.
A quarter of an hour afterwards the general, with two staff officers, rode down to within a short distance of the Modder, but all appeared still there. The banks were fringed with[Pg 123] bushes; a few horses, doubtless belonging to a party of Boer scouts, grazed quietly near these. A mile away to the right were the hotels and gardens of the village; far beyond them were the hills of Spytfontein and Magersfontein. There was high ground two or three thousand yards behind the river. To the right of the railway the Riet River joined the Modder. No signs of any large body of the enemy, no earth-works or other preparations for defence, could be perceived. Although he and his staff were within easy range of the river-bank not a shot was fired, and Lord Methuen came to the conclusion that the passage would be opposed at most by a comparatively small body of the Boers, and that not until he had advanced some distance would he come upon a position where Cronje was prepared to give battle. Accordingly he decided to lose no time.
Yorke had ridden out with a party of Rimington's men and ascended a low hill, from which they obtained an excellent view of the country. The Riet came down at a sharp angle to the point of its junction with the Modder. It was fringed on both sides with willows, and an enemy lying along this line would take in flank a force advancing towards the broken railway bridge. But even with their field-glasses they could see no sign of life near its banks. Albrecht, Cronje's engineer officer, knew his work, and had done it well. A very large body of Boers had been at work night and day for a fortnight, and within the line of willows and bushes deep trenches had been dug from which the Boers could fire with scarcely any danger to themselves. Gun emplacements had been formed on the northern bank both of the Riet and Modder, and had been so arranged that the guns could be easily shifted from one point to another whenever our gunners discovered their exact position and got the range. The houses and walls had all been loopholed. On the hills behind some very heavy guns had been placed, batteries had been erected on the rising ground near the village, and trenches dug everywhere close to the farther side of the rivers. Nearly ten thousand men were[Pg 124] lying down in absolute stillness, eagerly awaiting the moment when their unsuspecting enemies should fall into the trap so carefully prepared for them. The Transvaal commandos held the line from the railway bridge, and far up the bank of the Riet, while west of the bridge to the village the Free State men were posted.
"It looks all right," one of the officers with the party said. "I cannot make out a single soul stirring."
"I think it almost too still," another one said. "There must anyhow be some Boers about, and we should see them moving if there was not an imperative order for them not to show themselves. It is impossible to believe that they will allow us to cross the river without firing a shot, or that, as they have known for some time past that we were coming, they should have made no preparations for defence."
"Perhaps only a few hundred of them are there," another said. "They may have got such a strong position farther on that they prefer to fight us there. If they were to keep us from crossing, they would not have gained much; but if they were to defeat us somewhere on the other side of the river, the disaster might be a terrible one, for a force could come down behind us and cut off our retreat."
"But they can never defeat us," the first speaker said.
"No, we may feel pretty sure of that; but the Boers are so confident in their own fighting powers that they may very well believe that they will do so, and, of course, their dispositions will be in accordance with their belief and not with ours. There is the general with his two staff officers riding back. You see, not a shot has been fired at them."
"It certainly looks as if they did not intend to dispute the passage of the river," another officer said; "though they may have left a few hundred men as a rear-guard when the force retired. It is evident that the Boers prefer hill-fighting."
At four o'clock the next morning the troops moved forward, the infantry leading the way, followed by the cavalry and artillery. When they reached the level plain sloping gradually[Pg 125] towards the river, and some three miles across, the advanced guard were fired upon by the Boers at the extremity of their position on the Riet. The Lancers galloped forward in that direction, two batteries following them, and at seven o'clock opened fire, and drove the Boers from their advanced posts. The cavalry then threatened to cross the river, but were forced to retire before a heavy rifle-fire, and took up their position further back in order to cover the right flank should the Boers take the offensive. Three Boer guns now began to exchange shots with our batteries, but one of them was effectually silenced, and the others fired only occasionally.
In the meantime the infantry had been advancing in open order. To the right of the railway were the 2nd Coldstreams, the Grenadiers, the Scots Fusiliers, and a wing of the 1st Coldstreams. On the left of the line were the North Lancashires, the Yorkshires, Northumberlands, the Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, with half a battalion of the 1st Coldstreams in reserve. On that side was one battery of artillery; the naval guns took up their position close to the line. So far Lord Methuen had no reason to suppose that he was opposed by a larger force than that which had established itself on the further bank of the Riet. Accordingly there was no check to the advance. The noise of battle there had ceased, and parties of the enemy could be seen in retreat.
Cronje's plan had so far succeeded admirably. He had led his enemy to believe that they had but a small force opposed to them, and that this was already in retreat, and therefore, tempted them on to the plain, where they would be exposed to a murderous fire along their whole front, and which would be swept also by the strong force on the Riet. Not a shot was fired until the leading companies of the Guards were within a thousand yards of the river, when from the screen of trees and bush a line of fire burst out, and a hail of bullets swept the plain. Though many fell, no confusion was caused by this terrible surprise. The Guards, at once lay down and steadily returned the fire of their invisible[Pg 126] foes. There was no shelter to be taken, no favouring rock or bush. The plain was perfectly even and bare. Some were fortunate enough to find an ant-hill between them and their foe, others some scrub eight or ten inches only in height, but most of them lay on the bare sand.
It was well for them that they had marched that day without their greatcoats, for these would have shown up clearly upon the light sand, whereas at a thousand yards the khaki-clad figures could scarcely be made out by the keenest-sighted Boer. The scream of the bullets overhead was unceasing; the dust was knocked up as if by a hail-storm driven by a mighty wind; and even above the rattle of the musketry and the roar of cannon, the quick thud of the machine-guns firing one-pound shells—afterwards called by the men pom-poms—added a new horror to warfare.
The Scots Guards had suffered most from this outburst of fire, because they were nearest to the Riet, and therefore more exposed to the flanking fire of the Transvaalers there than were the battalions to their left. Their Maxim was almost immediately disabled by the pom-pom, and most of the men serving it killed. To remain in the position meant annihilation, and they fell back a few hundred yards to an old reservoir.
The Grenadiers and the 2nd Coldstreams were fortunate in finding some little protection under a very slight rise in the ground. All through the day the Guardsmen lay prone in the positions in which they had first halted. To retreat under that ceaseless hail of fire would have been as dangerous as to advance. There was nothing to do but to lie still and suffer. The sun beat down upon them with withering heat. Most of them lay with their rifles under them, for the breaches and barrels were too hot to handle. They were parched by a terrible thirst, and many were wounded, but neither water nor stretcher could be carried to them through the hail of bullets. The streams of balls from the pom-poms tried them even more than the bullets. At times there was a slight lull[Pg 127] in the firing, but the slightest movement caught the eyes of the watchful foe, and then it broke out again with renewed fury. It was clear from the first that nothing could be done on this side of the railway, and that the coming of darkness could alone bring relief.
Happily, however, things were going better to the left of the railway. The two batteries of artillery had galloped across to that side, and pushing on with extreme bravery, had opened a heavy fire upon the village and the Boer entrenchments. They were exposed not only to a continuous musketry fire, but to a cannonade from the Boer guns on the heights, more numerous and of heavier metal than their own; but they maintained their ground, aided by the four 12-pounders of the naval men. At half-past eleven, however, one of the batteries had to fall back, having lost heavily, and having nearly exhausted its ammunition. Twenty-five horses were killed as they dragged the guns back, and the officers' chargers had to be harnessed in their places.
It was due chiefly to the artillery that the day was finally won. Not only did they keep down the fire of the Boer marksmen by a hail of shrapnel, and shake the courage of the Free State men, but our men, lying themselves helpless, were cheered by the knowledge that our guns might yet be preparing a way for them to advance and to come within striking distance of their lurking foes.
Until two o'clock but little progress had been made on the left by the sorely-tried troops. The advance had been brought to a stand-still when it reached a point abreast of that obtained by the Guards. The frontal fire was as heavy, but they were not, like their comrades, scourged by a flanking fire, for although a party of Boers had pressed some distance round the extreme left, where there was rough ground that afforded some shelter, these were kept in check by the fire of the North Lancashires.
At two o'clock relief was furnished to the gunners by the arrival of another battery, which had made a tremendous[Pg 128] march from Belmont, and had now come up in time to take part in the desperate struggle. They at once came into action, and aided in sweeping the Boer position with shrapnel. Lord Methuen moved as many troops as could be spared from the right to aid in the left attack, where alone success seemed possible. The fire of the newly-arrived battery speedily drove the Boers established on our extreme left across the river, and the fire from the Free Staters, in their trenches among the willows on the south side, began to slacken, affording ground for the belief that here also they were becoming demoralized by the fire to which they were exposed, and were crossing the stream. The Yorkshires, Northumberlands, and Highlanders sprang to their feet, and with a rush charged a farmhouse strongly held which had covered the approach to the drift. The Boers here fled at once, and the troops, without halting, dashed forward, cheering loudly, delighted that at last they had become the assailants. Closely following the Boers, they reached the weir, erected across the river to deepen the water above, and made their way across holding by an iron bar above it.
The feat was performed under a tremendous fire. Though man after man fell, those behind crept forward until four hundred men had crossed and established themselves on the northern bank. Two hundred of the Lancashires followed them. It was a great success, and decided the fortune of the day, although for a time this still hung in the balance. General Pole-Carew, who was in command of the brigade, led them along the bank, pressing on towards the Boer centre. Cronje, however, drew supports from his left, and after winning their way for three-quarters of a mile, the pressure brought to bear against the British was too great to be withstood. Opposed by a greatly superior force in front, and suffering from a flanking fire from the entrenched slopes above them, the troops fell slowly back again, but maintained themselves near the dam against all the efforts of the Boers to drive them across it.
[Pg 129]
So the fight went on until darkness fell and the fire ceased. The troops could do no more. They had been at work since four in the morning, without breakfast; they had suffered tortures from heat and thirst during their long hours of inactivity, they had throughout the day been exposed to a terrible fire, which they had been unable to return effectually; and General Colville, who had succeeded to the command at half-past five, when Lord Methuen had been wounded, felt that he could ask no more of them, and contented himself with making preparations for passing the whole force early next morning across the dam Pole-Carew had won. But in the morning the Boers had gone. With his right turned, and the Free Staters utterly demoralized, Cronje felt that he could not hope to prevent the main body of the British from crossing, in which case they would be placed between him and Kimberley, and it would be impossible for him to regain the position he had so carefully prepared. The Boers, therefore, silently left the entrenchments they had occupied and marched away to Spytfontein.
Had the men from the Free State possessed the hardihood of those from the Transvaal, it is morally certain that no passage of the river could have been effected; but the military system which, north of the Vaal was vigorous though irregular, and made every man a soldier, was but a shadow in the Orange Free State. At peace with their neighbours, fearing no attack, on good terms with the British Government, whose territory adjoined their own to the south and west, and for the most part to the east, save where Basutoland, wholly under British influence, touched them, it seemed there was no occasion to maintain a military organization. They had given themselves up to peaceful pursuits, and although a pastoral people, were immeasurably in advance of their neighbours north of the Vaal. The majority, too, wholly disapproved of the war into which the ambition of their president had forced them, and in such a mood[Pg 130] might well be shaken by the terrible bombardment they had to face.
Considering the incessant fire to which, for some twelve hours, the British troops had been exposed, it is remarkable that our casualties should not have exceeded four hundred and fifty. Of these one hundred and twelve were contributed by the Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, and sixty-nine by the Coldstreams.
But even to the troops lying helpless all day, the hours had not passed more slowly and painfully than to the cavalry in their enforced inactivity. They had dismounted to ease their horses, and the men and officers of Rimington's Guides stood in little groups ready to mount at a moment's notice.
"It is awful," one of the officers said; "it is simply awful! One would think that not a single man exposed to that storm of fire would be found alive at the end of the day. What maddens one is the thought that all this might have been spared us, if we had not blundered into it as if we had been going to a picnic. Why, if only a troop of us had been sent down yesterday afternoon, or early this morning, to reconnoitre, we should have been spared all this. We could have dismounted here and made our way down in very open order, on foot, say fifty yards apart, and pushed on till we got to the willows, and through them to the river bank; or, better still, we could have entered the willows to the right here and searched them thoroughly right round across the railway and as far as the village.
"As it turns out, of course, we should have lost three-quarters of our number; but those who got back would have told of the hidden rifle-pits, and the fact that the Boers were gathered there in great force. But somehow, it was taken for granted that there would not be any serious resistance. Even when the troops went forward, there were no scouts pushed out in front of the attacking line. We have just fallen into the trap they set for us. It was the[Pg 131] same at Belmont and at Graspan. We only found out where the enemy were in force when they opened a blaze of fire at us.
"I was chatting with a private in the infantry, who, before he joined the army, was a volunteer in one of the London battalions, and he told me that when Lord Methuen was in command of the district there was no one more particular than he as to patrols being thrown out far ahead and the ground being thoroughly scouted. He was very popular, for though strict, he was always kind and considerate. As to his bravery there is no question, and the way in which he is exposing himself to-day, galloping about from point to point open to Boer fire, is splendid; but I fancy his staff will be thinned out before the end of the day."
"Those fellows must be well in hand," another said, "or they would never have held their fire when he rode up to within four hundred yards of them yesterday. They could have made a certainty of picking him and the two officers with him off at that distance, and if only half a dozen had fired it would have seemed that there might still only be a little party left behind.
"The beggars seem to have more idea of discipline than we gave them credit for. They must have been sitting as quiet as mice until they opened fire, for, watching the bushes closely with my glass, I did not see as much as a leaf stir."
And so they talked until they saw the rush of the men of the Ninth Brigade down to the river, and although they could not make out exactly what was doing, they concluded by the gradual disappearance of the troops and the roar of musketry that they must have succeeded in crossing the river. The relief was intense, and the men shouted and cheered and waved their hats in the greatest delight. The officers joined in a lively argument as to what was likely to take place. All agreed that it would be next to impossible to move troops over to support those who had crossed, for[Pg 132] by their own feelings of exhaustion, brought on by hunger, thirst, heat, and excitement, they felt sure that the troops, who had gone through a far more severe ordeal, would need food, drink, and at least some hours' rest before they could again take up the stern work. At the same time, all saw that if the Boers hurled themselves on the little force on the other side of the river, assistance must be sent, whatever the state of the men might be.
"They have only to call for volunteers," one officer said, "and I doubt if a man would hold back. After what they have gone through, it would almost galvanize a dead man into life to know that there was a chance at last to meet face to face the men who had been making a target of them. But I expect the Boers must be nearly as done up as we are. They were in their places before daylight, and although I don't suppose our bullets have disposed of many of them, their nerves must be so shaken up by our artillery fire that I can't think there can be much fight left in them. We know that their fire on the left has been slackening for some time, and the fact that our fellows have been able to fight their way across is another proof of it. Besides, as we saw at the last two fights, they lose heart directly they see their retreat threatened, and they must know that they will be cut off altogether from the place they have fortified farther on, if we can but maintain our footing, for success on our left would put us between them and Kimberley."