MANY HISTORIANS assert that the French failed at Borodino because Napoleon had a cold in his head; that if he had not had a cold the orders given by him before and during the battle would have been even more remarkable for their genius, and Russia would have been lost and the face of the world would have been changed. To historians, who can maintain that Russia was transformed at the will of one man—Peter the Great—and that France, from a republic, became an empire, and that the French army marched into Russia at the will of one man—Napoleon—the conclusion that Russia has remained a power because Napoleon had a bad cold on the 26th of August may seem indisputable and convincing. Had it depended on Napoleon's will to fight, or not to fight, at Borodino, or had it depended on his will whether he gave this order or that, it is evident that a cold, affecting the manifestation of his will, might be the saving of Russia, and consequently the valet, who forgot to put on Napoleon's waterproof boots on the 24th, would be the saviour of Russia. On that method of reasoning such a deduction is inevitable; as inevitable as the contention which Voltaire maintains in jest (unconscious what he was ridiculing) that the Massacre of St. Bartholomew was due to an attack of dyspepsia from which Charles IX was suffering. But for minds that cannot admit that Russia was transformed at the will of one man—Peter the Great—and the French empire was created, and the war with Russia begun, at the will of one man—Napoleon—such a contention will seem not merely unsound and irrational, but contrary to the whole nature of humanity. The question, What constitutes the cause of historical events? will suggest to them another answer, resting on the idea that the course of earthly events is predestined from on high, depends on the combination of all the wills of the men taking part in those events, and that the predominant influence of Napoleon in those events is purely external and fictitious.
Strange at first sight as appears the proposition that the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, the order for which was given by Charles IX., was not the result of his will, and that it was only in his fancy that the command he had given was the cause of it, and that the Borodino slaughter of eighty thousand men was not due to Napoleon's will (though he gave the order for the commencement of the battle), and that it was only his fancy that it was his doing, strange as this proposition appears, yet human dignity, that tells us that every one of us is neither more nor less a man than Napoleon, bids us admit that solution of the question, and historical researches abundantly confirm the proposition.
At the battle of Borodino Napoleon did not fire at any one, nor kill any one. All that was done by his soldiers. Therefore it was not he who killed those men. The soldiers of the French army went out to slay their fellow-men at Borodino, not owing to Napoleon's commands, but through their own desire to do so. The whole army—French, Italians, Germans, Poles—hungry, ragged, and exhausted by the march, felt at the sight of an army, barring their way to Moscow: the wine is drawn, it must be drunk. Had Napoleon forbidden them at that point to fight the Russians, they would have killed him, and have proceeded to fight the Russians, because it was inevitable for them.
When they heard Napoleon's proclamation, offering them as consolation for maiming and death the reminder that posterity would say that they had been at the battle before Moscow, they shouted, “Vive l'Empereur,” just as they shouted “Vive l'Empereur” at the sight of the picture of the little boy playing cup and ball with the earth, and just as they shouted “Vive l'Empereur” at every absurdity that was said. There was nothing left for them to do but to shout “Vive l'Empereur!” and to fight so as to get food and rest as conquerors in Moscow. Therefore it was not owing to Napoleon's commands that they killed their fellow-men.
And it was not Napoleon who ordained the course of the battle, because none of his instructions were put into execution, and he knew nothing of what was passing before him. Therefore the manner in which these men slaughtered one another did not depend on Napoleon's will, but proceeded independently of him, from the wills of the hundreds of thousands of men who took part in the affair. It only seemed to Napoleon that all this was due to his will. And therefore the question whether Napoleon had or had not a cold in his head is of no more interest to history than the cold of the lowest soldier of the commissariat.
The contention of some writers, that Napoleon's cold was the reason of his previous instructions and commands during the battle being weaker than usual, is completely groundless.
The instructions that have been reproduced here are by no means inferior, are indeed superior, to many similar arrangements by which he had gained victories in the past. His supposed instructions during the day were also in no way inferior to the commands he had given in previous battles, but were much the same as usual. But these instructions are supposed to be inferior, simply because Borodino was the first battle in which Napoleon was not victorious. The finest and profoundest combinations seem very poor, and every military student can criticise them with a consequential air, when the battle has not been won by means of them; and the stupidest combinations will seem exceedingly ingenious, and serious writers will fill volumes in proving their excellence, when the battle that followed chances to have been a victory.
The plan composed by Weierother at Austerlitz was a model of perfection in its own line, but it has yet been condemned, and condemned for its very perfection, for its over-minuteness in detail.
At Borodino Napoleon played his part as the representative of supreme power as well, or even better, than he had done at previous battles. He did nothing likely to hinder the progress of the battle; he yielded to the most sensible advice; he was not confused, did not contradict himself, did not lose his presence of mind, nor run away from the field of battle, but with his great tact and military experience, he performed calmly and with dignity his role of appearing to be in supreme control of it all.
①法语：而世界的面貌也就会改变了。
①巴托洛缪之夜指一五七二年八月二十四日的前夕，巴黎天主教对于戈诺教徒的大屠杀。
在波罗底诺战役中，拿破仑没有对任何人射击，也没有杀一个人，一切都是士兵做的。由此可见，杀人的不是他。
法国士兵在波罗底诺战役中屠杀俄国士兵，并不是由于拿破仑的命令，而是出于自愿。全部军队：法国人、意大利人、德国人、波兰人——他们饥肠辘辘、衣衫褴褛、在行军中累得精疲力尽，——看见阻碍他们去莫斯科的军队，他们就感到，le vin est tiré et qu'il faut le boire①。假若拿破仑当时禁止他们和俄国人打仗，他们会把他杀死，然后去打俄国人，因为这是他们必需要做的。
当他们听到拿破仑在命令中晓谕他们，子孙后代会因为他们在莫斯科城下战斗过，有过阵亡和受伤而得到慰藉，他们就高呼：“Vive l'empereur！”②，正像他们一看见小孩用小棒捅地球的画像，就喊：“Vive l'empereur！”一样，也正如他们不论听到什么毫无意义的话就高呼？“Vive l'empereur！”一样。他们除了高呼“Vive l'empereur！”和去打仗，以便在莫斯科以征服者的身份得到食物和休息以外，再没有什么事可做了。由此看来，他们残杀自己的同类并非由于拿破仑的命令。
①法语：瓶塞已打开，就得把酒喝掉。
②法语：皇帝万岁。
一些作者又说，由于拿破仑感冒，他的部署和在战斗中的命令不像以前那么好，这完全不正确。正是这一点说明拿破仑八月二十六日的感冒没有什么意义。
此处引述的战斗部署一点也不比先前他打胜仗的所有战斗部署更差，甚至还要好些。那些在战斗中臆想的命令也并不比以前的更差，完全和以前的一样。这些部署和命令之所以好像比以前差，那不过是因为波罗底诺战役是拿破仑第一次败北罢了。不论多么优秀单绝、深思熟虑的部署和命令，只要据此打了败仗，就好像是非常糟的，每一个军事科学家都煞有介事地批评它们，不论多么糟的部署和命令，只要据此打了胜仗，就好像是非常好的，那些严肃认真的学者都撰写卷帙浩繁的书籍论证它的优点。
魏罗特尔拟定的奥斯特利茨战役的部署，就是这类作品的完美典范，但是人们仍然指摘它，指摘它的完美，指摘它过分的烦琐。
拿破仑在波罗底诺战役中完成它作为权力代表者的任务并不比在其他战役中完成得差，甚至更好些。他并没有作出妨碍战斗进行的事情；他倾听比较合理的意见；他没有手忙脚乱，没有自相矛盾，没有惊慌失措，也没有从战场上逃跑，而是施展了他那巨大的节制能力和作战经验，镇静而庄严地扮演了他那貌似统帅的角色。