SEVEN YEARS had passed by. The storm-tossed, historic ocean of Europe was subsiding within its shores. It seemed to have grown calm; but the mysterious forces moving humanity (mysterious, because the laws controlling their action are unknown to us) were still at work.
Although the surface of the ocean of history seemed motionless, the movement of humanity was as uninterrupted as the flow of time. Various series of groups of men were joining together and separating; the causes were being prepared that would bring about the formation and the dissolution of empires and the migrations of peoples.
The ocean of history was not now, as before, tossed violently from one shore to the other; it was seething in its depths. Historical figures were not dashing abruptly from one side to the other; now they seemed to be rotating on the same spot. The historical figures, that had in the preceding years at the head of armies reflected the movement of the masses, commanding wars, and marches, and battles, now reflected that movement in political and diplomatic combinations, statutes, and treaties.
This tendency on the part of the figures of history, the historians call the reaction.
In describing the part played by these historical personages, the historians criticise them severely, supposing them to be the cause of what they call the reaction. All the celebrated persons of that period, from Alexander and Napoleon to Madame de Sta?l, Foty, Schelling, Fichte, Chateaubriand, and so on, receive the severest criticism at their hands, and are acquitted or condemned according as they worked for progress or for reaction.
In Russia, too, so they tell us, a reaction was taking place at that period, and the person chiefly to blame for that reaction was Alexander I.—the same Alexander who, by their own account, was chiefly responsible for the liberal movement at the beginning of his reign, and for the saving of Russia.
In modern Russian literature there is no one, from the schoolboy essay writer to the learned historian, who would not throw his stone at Alexander for the unprincipled acts of this later period of his reign.
“He should have acted in such and such a way. On that occasion he acted well, and on that other he acted ill. He behaved splendidly in the beginning of his reign and during 1812; but he did ill in giving a constitution to Poland, in making the Holy Alliance, in letting Araktcheev have power, in encouraging Golitsin and mysticism; and later on, in encouraging Shishkov, and Foty. He acted wrongly in interfering with the army on active service; he acted wrongly in cashiering the Semyonovsky regiment, and so on.”
One might cover ten pages in enumerating all the faults found in him by the historians on the assumption that they possess a knowledge of what is for the good of humanity.
What do these criticisms mean?
Do not the very actions for which the historians applaud Alexander I., such as the liberalism of the early part of his reign, the struggle with Napoleon, the firmness shown in 1812, and the campaign of 1813, proceed from those very sources—the circumstances of birth and breeding and life that made Alexander's personality what it was—from which proceed also the acts for which he is censured by the historians, such as the Holy Alliance, the restoration of Poland, the reaction from 1820 onward?
What is the substance of the charge brought in these criticisms? It is a charge brought against an historical personage standing at the highest possible pinnacle of human power, as it were, in the focus where all the rays of history concentrated their blinding light upon him; a personage subjected to the strongest influences of intrigue, deceit, flattery, and self-deception, inseparable from power; a personage who felt himself at every moment of his life responsible for all that was being done in Europe; and a personage, not an invented character, but a live creature, like any other man, with his own personal idiosyncrasies, and passions and impulses towards goodness, beauty, and truth. And the charge brought against this personage is not that he was not virtuous (the historians have no reproach to make against him on this score), but that he, living fifty years ago, had not the same views as to the good of humanity as those held to-day by a professor who has, from his youth up, been engaged in study, i.e. in reading books, listening to lectures, and making notes of those books and those lectures in a note-book.
But even if we assume that Alexander I., fifty years ago, was mistaken in his view of what was for the good of peoples, we can hardly help assuming that the historian, criticising Alexander, will, after a certain lapse of time, prove to be also incorrect in his view of what is for the good of humanity. It is the more natural and inevitable to assume this because, watching the development of history, we see that with every year, with every new writer, the view of what is for the good of humanity is somewhat shifted; so that what did seem good, after ten years, is regarded as harmful, and vice versa. That is not all. We even find in history the views of contemporaries as to what was good, and what was harmful, utterly opposed to one another. Some regard the giving of a constitution to Poland, and the Holy Alliance, as highly to the credit of Alexander; while others regard the same actions as a slur on his name.
It is impossible to say of the careers of Alexander and of Napoleon that they were beneficial or harmful, seeing that we cannot say wherein the benefit or harm of humanity lies. If any one dislikes the career of either, he only dislikes it from its incompatibility with his own limited conception of what is the good of humanity. Even though I regard as good the preservation of my father's house in Moscow in 1812, or the glory of the Russian army, or the flourishing of the Petersburg or some other university, or the independence of Poland, or the supremacy of Russia, or the balance of European power, or a special branch of European enlightenment—progress—yet I am bound to admit that the activity of any historical personage had, apart from such ends, other ends more general and beyond my grasp.
But let us suppose that so-called science has the power of conciliating all contradictions, and has an invariable standard of good and bad by which to try historical personages and events.
Let us suppose that Alexander could have acted quite differently. Let us assume that, in accordance with the prescription of those who censure him, and who profess a knowledge of the final end of the movement of humanity, he could have followed that programme of nationalism, of freedom, of equality, and of progress (there seems to be no other) which his modern critics would have selected for him. Let us suppose that programme could have been possible, and had actually been formulated at that time, and that Alexander could have acted in accordance with it. What, then, would have become of the activity of all the persons who were opposing the tendency of the government of that day—of the activity which, in the opinion of the historians, was good and beneficial? There would have been none of that activity; there would have been no life; there would have been nothing.
Once admit that human life can be guided by reason, and all possibility of life is annihilated.
虽然，历史海洋的表面似乎不在运动，但人类却像不断前进的时间一样，继续向前迈进。人们所组成的各种集团建立了，又解散了。国家的建立和解体以及各个民族的迁移的种种原因都在酝酿着。
历史的海洋，已不像先前那样从此岸向彼岸凶猛急遽地冲击；但它却在海水的深处汹涌翻腾。历史人物也不像先前那样被波涛从此岸向彼岸卷过来卷过去；现在他们仿佛停留在原处，只是在漩涡里打转。原先，这些历史人物领导着军队，发布命令，宣战、出征、会战，藉之以击退民众运动；而现在却巧用政治和外交手腕，利用法律和条约来击退汹涌澎湃的群众运动。
历史人物的这种活动，史学家们称之为反动。
史学家们在描述这些过去的历史人物的活动时，往往声色俱厉地谴责他们，因为史学家们认为那些历史人物就是他们所指的反动的祸根。当时所有闻名的人物，从亚历山大和拿破仑到斯塔埃尔夫人、福蒂、谢林、费希特、谢多勃良以及和其他一些人物都遭受到史学家们的严正的审判，并视他们是否有助于进步或反动而宣告无罪或加以谴责。
按照史学家们的记载，这一时期在俄国也发生过反动，这次反动的元凶，就是亚历山大一世。正是这个亚历山大一世（仍然是按照史学家们的记载）在其统治初期就倡导自由主义，宣扬拯救俄国。
在现有的俄国文献中，从中学生到学识渊博的史学家，没有一人不因亚历山大一世在位时的错误行为而向他投掷石子。
“他本应如此这般地行事。他在某件事上做得好，而在另一件事上则做得糟。他在当政初期和一八一二年干得很出色；但是，给波兰制订宪法、成立神圣同盟、把大权授与阿拉克契耶夫、鼓励戈利岑和神秘主义，嗣后又鼓励希什科夫和福蒂，这些事就做得很糟。他过问前线的军队，做得不对；解散谢苗诺夫兵团，他也处理得不当，等等，等等。”
史学家根据他们所具有的关于人类福利的知识，对亚历山大一世所作的种种责备，如果要加以枚举的话，就得写满整整十页纸。
这些责备是什么意思呢？
亚历山大一世受到史学家赞扬的行为，如登位初期的一些自由主义的创举、抗击拿破仑、一八一二年所表现的强硬态度、一八一三年的出征，同那些受到史学家谴责的行为，如成立神圣同盟、使波兰复国、二十年代的反动，不都是从形成亚历山大一世个性的血统、教育、生活诸条件的同一根源中产生出来的吗？
这些责备的实质究竟是什么呢？
其实质在于：亚历山大一世是一个处于人类权力可能达到的顶峰、就像是处于夺目的历史光辉在他身上聚成的焦点上的历史人物。像他这样的人物，理应受到伴随权力而来的阴谋、欺诈、阿谀、自欺的世上最强有力的影响；像他这样的人物，在他一生中的每时每刻都感到自己应对欧洲所发生的一切负责。这个人物不是凭空虚构的，而是有血有肉的活人。他像所有的人那样，有自己的习惯、情欲、对真善美的渴望——这个人物在五十年前，并非缺乏美德（史学家也没有在这方面责难他）。但是他却没有当代教授们对人类幸福所具有的看法和观点——这些教授们从青年时代起就钻研学问，广谈博览，领会讲义材料的精神，并把他的心得记在自己的笔记本上。
假定说，五十年前亚历山大一世对人类的幸福的看法是错误的，那么，当然也应该这样认为，指摘亚历山大的史学家对人类幸福的观点，在若干年之后，也将被认为是不正确的。这种假定之所以合乎情理，必不可少，那是因为我们只要注意一下历史的发展，就会看到，对人类幸福的看法，随着时代的不同，随着作家的不同，在不断地改变着。因此，本来认为是福，十年后就会认为是祸，反之亦然。不仅如此，即使在同一时期，我们可以看到历史上对祸福的看法有时也是完全矛盾的。例如，一些人认为给波兰以宪法和神圣同盟是亚历山大的功劳，但另一些人却因此而谴责亚历山大。
对亚历山大和拿破仑的行为，不能简单地说有益或有害，因为我们说不出它为什么有益和为什么有害。假如某些人不喜欢某些活动，无非是因为这些活动不符合他对幸福的狭隘的看法。不论是一八一二年我父亲在莫斯科的房子得到保存，还是俄国军队的光荣，或者彼得堡大学或其他大学的繁荣，或者波兰的自由，或者俄国的强大，或者欧洲的均衡，或者欧洲的某种文明进步，对这些现象不论我是否认为是福，我都得承认，任何历史人物的行为，除了这些目的之外，还有其他我所不理解的更带有普遍性的目的。
可是，我们假定所谓科学有调和一切矛盾的可能性，它也有衡量历史人物和历史事件好坏永不改变的尺度。
我们假定，亚历山大能够按照另外一个样子来做这一切事情。我们假定，他可以按照那些指责他的、自命深知人类活动终极目标的人的指示行事，同时依照现在指责他的人所提供的民族性、自由、平等和进步的纲领（似乎也没有更新的纲领了）治国。我们假定，可能有这么一个纲领，而且已经拟定好了，亚历山大也按照这个纲领来办了。那么，那些反对当时政府方针政策的人们的一切活动——史学家认为那些活动是有益的，好的，会成什么样呢？这种活动是不会有的，实际的生活也不会有，所有这一切都不会有的。
如果说，人类的生活可以受理性支配，那就不可能有实际生活了。