EVER SINCE the law of Copernicus was discovered and proved, the mere recognition that not the sun, but the earth moves, has destroyed the whole cosmography of the ancients. By disproving the law, it might have been possible to retain the old conception of the movements of the heavenly bodies; but without disproving it, it would seem to be impossible to continue studying the Ptolemaic worlds. But as a fact even after the discovery of the law of Copernicus, the Ptolemaic worlds long continued to be a subject of study.
Ever since the first person said and proved that the number of births or crimes is subject to mathematical laws, that certain geographical and politico-economical laws determine this or that form of government, that certain relations of the population to the soil lead to migrations of peoples—from that moment the foundations on which history was built were destroyed in their essence.
By disproving those new laws, the old view of history might have been retained. But without disproving them, it would seem impossible to continue studying historical events, merely as the arbitrary product of the free will of individual men. For if a certain type of government is established, or a certain movement of peoples takes place in consequence of certain geographical, ethnographical, or economic conditions, the free will of those persons who are described to us as setting up that type of government or leading that movement cannot be regarded as the cause.
And yet history goes on being studied as of old, side by side with laws of statistics, of geography, of political economy, of comparative philology and geology, that flatly contradict its assumptions.
The struggle between the new views and the old was long and stubborn in physical philosophy. Theology stood on guard over the old view, and accused the new view of violating revelation. But when truth gained the day, theology established itself as firmly as ever on a new basis.
As long and as obstinate is the conflict to-day between the old and the new view of history; and in the same way theology stands on guard over the old view, and accuses the new of attacking revelation.
In both cases on both sides, the struggle rouses evil passions and stifles truth. On one side there is dread and regret at demolishing the edifice that has been raised by the ages; on the other, the passion for destruction.
To the men who fought against the new truths of physical philosophy, it seemed that if they were to admit that truth, it would shatter faith in God, in the creation of the firmament, in the miracle of Joshua, the son of Nun. To the champions of the laws of Copernicus and Newton, to Voltaire, for instance, it seemed that the laws of astronomy were destructive of religion, and the latter made use of the law of gravity as a weapon against religion.
So now it seems that we have but to admit the law of necessity to shatter the conception of the soul, of good, of evil, and of the political and ecclesiastical edifices reared on the basis of those conceptions.
So too, like Voltaire in his day, the champions of the law of necessity use the law as a weapon against religion, though, like the law of Copernicus in astronomy, the law of necessity in history, far from destroying even strengthens the foundation on which political and ecclesiastical edifices are reared.
Just as then in the question of astronomy, now in the question of history, the whole difference of view rested on the recognition or non-recognition of an absolute unit as a measure of visible phenomena. For astronomy, this was the immobility of the earth; in history, the independence of personality—free will.
Just as in astronomy the difficulty of admitting the motion of the earth lay in the immediate sensation of the earth's stationariness and of the planets' motion, so in history the difficulty of recognising the subjection of the personality to the laws of space and time and causation lies in the difficulty of surmounting the direct sensation of the independence of one's personality. But just as in astronomy, the new view said, “It is true, we do not feel the movement of the earth, but, if we admit its immobility, we are reduced to absurdity, while admitting its movement, we are led to laws”; so in history, the new view says, “It is true, we do not feel our dependence, but admitting our free will, we are led to absurdity; admitting our dependence on the external world, time, and cause, we are led to laws.”
In the first case, we had to surmount the sensation of an unreal immobility in space, and to admit a motion we could not perceive of by sense. In the present case, it is as essential to surmount a consciousness of an unreal freedom and to recognise a dependence not perceived by our senses.
①托勒美是古希腊学者、天文学家和地理学家，创立天动说。
推翻了这些新法则，就可以保持旧的历史观；但是，不推翻它们，似乎就不能研究作为人们自由意志产物的历史事件。因为，假若由于某种地理条件、人种或经济条件而建立某种管理形式，或发动某一民族迁徙，那么，在我们看来那些认为建立管理形式或发动民族迁徙的人的自由意志就不能被视为原因。
同时，以前的历史与完全违反它的原理的统计学、地理学、政治经济学、比较语言学和地质学的法则继续被人研究着。
新旧观点在自然哲学中进行了长期的、顽强的斗争。神学保护旧观点，责备新观点破坏神的启示。但是当真理获得胜利的时候，神学就在新的基础上同样牢固地建立起来。
现时，新旧历史观点同样进行着长久的，顽强的斗争，神学同样维护旧观点，责备新观点破坏神的启示。
在上述两种情况下，斗争从两方面唤起强烈的感情，扑灭真理。一方面，为许多世纪建立起来的整座大厦而恐惧和惋惜；另一方面，出现了要求破坏的炽烈的感情。
在反对新兴的自然哲学的真理的人们看来，如果他们承认这种真理，就要破坏他们对上帝，对创造宇宙万物，对嫩的儿子约书亚的奇迹①所怀有的信仰。在保卫哥白尼和牛顿定律的人们看来，例如在伏尔泰②看来，似乎天文学的法则摧毁了宗教，于是他利用万有引力定律作为反对宗教的工具。
①见《圣经·旧约·约书亚记》。
②伏尔泰（1694～1778），法国唯物主义哲学家。
正如当年的伏尔泰一样，现在那些自告奋勇的必然性法则的捍卫者利用必然性法则作为反对宗教的工具；但是，正如哥白尼在天文学方面的定律一样，历史的必然性法则不但没有摧毁国家和教会机构赖以建立的基础，甚至巩固地奠定那个基础。
现在的历史学问题正如当年的天文学问题一样，各种观点上的不同就在于承认或不承认一种绝对的单位作为看得见的现象的尺度。在天文学上是地球的不动性；在历史学上是个人的独立性——自由意志。
正如在天文学上，承认地球运行的困难乃在于否定地球不动而行星运动的直接感觉，在历史学上，承认个人服从空间，时间和因果关系的法则的困难，乃在于否定我们个人的独立性的直接感觉。但是，天文学的新观点表明：“诚然，我们觉察不出地球的运行，但是，如果假定它不动，我们就会得出荒谬绝伦的结论；如果假定它在运行，尽管我们觉察不出来，但是我们却得出了法则。”历史的新观点也这样表明：“诚然，我们感觉不到我们的依赖性，但是，如果假定我们有自由意志，我们就得出了荒谬绝伦的结论，如果假定我们对外部世界、时间、因果关系存有依赖性，我们就得出了法则。”
在第一种情形下，要否定地球在空间静止的意识，并且承认我们感觉不到它的运动；在现在的情形下，同样要否定被意识到的自由意志，并且承认我们感觉不出的依赖性。